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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Zabrina B. Delgado, Petitioner. 
Appellate Case No. 2019-001003 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on May 22, 
2017, Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the Bar of this State.  
Currently, Petitioner is a regular member of the Bar in good standing. 
Petitioner has now submitted a resignation from the South Carolina Bar pursuant to 
Rule 409 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules.  The resignation is 
accepted. 
Within twenty (20) days of the date of this order, Petitioner shall surrender the 
certificate of admission to the Clerk of this Court.  If Petitioner cannot locate this 
certificate, Petitioner shall provide the Clerk with an affidavit indicating this fact 
and indicating that the certificate will be immediately surrendered if it is 
subsequently located. 
FOR THE COURT 
s/ Daniel E. Shearouse 
 CLERK
Columbia, South Carolina 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Supreme Court 
In the Matter of Melisa White Gay, Respondent 
Appellate Case No. 2019-000635 
Opinion No. 27899 
Submitted June 11, 2019 – Filed July 3, 2019 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
John S. Nichols, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ericka 
McCants Williams, Senior Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel, both of Columbia, for the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel. 
Barbara Marie Seymour, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, Respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (the Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  In the 
Agreement, Respondent admits misconduct and consents to the imposition of a 
definite suspension for six months.  Respondent also requests the definite 
suspension be made retroactive to the date of her interim suspension: March 21, 
2018.1  We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from the practice of law 
in this state for six months, retroactive to the date of her interim suspension.  The 
facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
1 In re Gay, 422 S.C. 386, 812 S.E.2d 207 (2018). 
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Facts 
On February 27, 2019, Respondent entered a plea of no contest to the charge of 
unlawful communication in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-430(A)(1) (2015).  
The facts of the plea indicated that, on December 13, 2017, Respondent willfully 
and unlawfully conveyed "an immoral message while in a telephonic 
communication with an individual."  Specifically, while meeting with one of her 
criminal clients who was in custody related to a narcotics trafficking case, 
Respondent instructed the client's girlfriend to remove United States currency and 
paperwork from the bathroom of the client's home and take the currency and 
paperwork to an associate of the client.  Respondent was sentenced to one day in 
jail with credit for one day served. 
Law 
Respondent admits that by her conduct she violated the following provisions of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.4(a) (violating the Rules 
of Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(b) (committing a criminal act that reflects 
adversely on the lawyer's honesty, truthworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer); Rule 
8.4(d) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation), and Rule 8.4(e) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice).   
Respondent further admits her conduct constitutes grounds for discipline under 
Rule 7(a)(1), RLDE (violating the Rules of Professional Conduct) and Rule 
7(a)(5), RLDE (engaging in conduct tending to pollute the administration of justice 
or bringing the courts or the legal profession into disrepute), Rule 413, SCACR. 
Conclusion 
We find Respondent's misconduct warrants a definite suspension from the practice 
of law in this state for six months, retroactive to March 21, 2018, the date of 
Respondent's interim suspension.  Accordingly, we accept the Agreement and 
suspend Respondent for a period of six months, retroactive to her earlier interim 
suspension. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, Respondent shall 
pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by ODC 
and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct in full or enter into a reasonable payment 
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plan with the Commission for payment of the costs incurred.  Prior to seeking 
reinstatement, Respondent must demonstrate her compliance with Rule 32, RLDE, 
Rule 413, SCACR, including completion of Legal Ethics and Practice Program 
Ethics School within the preceding year. 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 




THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
In The Court of Appeals 
IN RE: Deborah Dereede Living Trust dated December 
18, 2013, Hugh Dereede and Tyre Dealer Network 




Courtney Feeley Karp, Individually and As Trustee of the 
Deborah Dereede Living Trust dated December 18, 2013 
and Michael Fehily, as a qualified beneficiary of the 
Deborah Dereede Living Trust dated December 18, 2013, 
Defendants,  
 
Of whom Courtney Feeley Karp, Individually and As 
Trustee of the Deborah Dereede Living Trust dated 
December 18, 2013, is the Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001921 
 
 
Appeal From York County 
S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5639 
Heard December 6, 2018 – April 10, 2019 
Withdrawn, Substituted and Refiled July 3, 2019 
 
 
 AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART 
 
Desa Ballard and Harvey M. Watson, III, both of Ballard 
& Watson, Attorneys at Law, of West Columbia; and 
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Peter John Nosal and Thomas Carroll Jeter, III, both of 
Nosal & Jeter, LLP, of Fort Mill, all for Appellant. 
 
John P. Gettys, Jr. and Daniel Joseph Ballou, both of 
Morton & Gettys, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Respondents. 
 
HILL, J.: After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Courtney Feeley Karp 
breached her fiduciary duty as Trustee of a trust created by her late mother by not 
timely distributing certain trust proceeds to Hugh Dereede (Hugh), Karp's stepfather, 
and to Tyre Dealer Network Consultants, Inc. (Tyre), Hugh's company.  The trial 
court also awarded Hugh attorney's fees and held Karp personally liable for the 




Some eight months before her death, Deborah Dereede (Deborah), Karp's mother, 
executed a revocable trust.  She named herself trustee and designated Karp as 
successor trustee.  The only asset in the trust was a home located in Lake Wylie, 
South Carolina, which Deborah put on the market for sale a few months later.  
Several months after Deborah's death, Karp sold the house, netting $356,242.86.  
 
This appeal turns on the following trust provision:  
 
As soon as practicable following my death, my Trustee 
shall sell the house and lot located at 131 WHISPERING 
PINES DR., LAKE WYLIE, SC 29710.  The sales 
proceeds shall be used first to pay off any mortgage 
against the property, and second to pay off that certain 
promissory note given by me to TYRE DEALER 
NETWORK CONSULTANTS, INC.  Said promissory 
note, at the time of the execution of my Trust, is in the 
amount of $250,000.00, but in no event shall the amount 
due exceed one-half of the sales price of the property.  
After payoff of said mortgage and said note, my Trustee 
shall then distribute one-half of the remaining net sales 
proceeds to HUGH DEREEDE, outright and free of trust.  
The other one-half of the remaining net sales proceeds 
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shall be distributed in accordance with the Articles that 
follow. 
 
After the sale of the house closed, Hugh demanded immediate payment of his and 
Tyre's share of the proceeds.  Karp, who was also the personal representative of 
Deborah's estate, believed she could not distribute the proceeds until she was certain 
of the net assets of the trust and the estate, and the time for creditor's claims had 
expired.  Hugh would not be delayed, however, and filed this action in the probate 
court seeking a declaratory judgment for immediate payment.  After procedural 
sparring, Karp removed the case to circuit court.  She continued to refuse Hugh's 
distribution request but now also claimed that, by suing her, Hugh and Tyre had 
triggered the trust's no-contest clause thereby forfeiting their right to the proceeds.  
In the event of such a forfeiture, the disputed monies would go to Karp and her 
siblings as remainder beneficiaries.    
 
Ten months into the litigation, Karp appointed, with Hugh's consent, Catherine H. 
Kennedy as trust protector as contemplated by the trust.  Kennedy filed a report 
concluding Karp was justified in waiting on any creditor's claims to clear before 
making any trust distributions and that the issues of whether Karp exercised good 
faith in invoking the no contest clause and whether probable cause supported Hugh 
and Tyre's claims should be decided by the court.   
 
Karp and Hugh testified at the bench trial.  Karp called Kennedy as a witness, while 
Hugh presented S. Alan Medlin as his expert.  The trial court ruled (1) Karp breached 
her fiduciary duty by not timely distributing the house sale proceeds to Tyre and 
Hugh; (2) Hugh had probable cause to bring this action, and therefore the no contest 
clause did not apply; (3) because Tyre was a creditor, the no contest clause was 
inapplicable to it; and (4) Tyre and Hugh were entitled to attorney's fees and costs 




Because a breach of fiduciary duty claim can be legal or equitable, see Verenes v. 
Alvanos, 387 S.C. 11, 17, 690 S.E.2d 771, 773 (2010) (stating "an action alleging a 
breach of fiduciary duty is an action at law," but also that "a breach of fiduciary duty 
may sound in equity if the relief sought is equitable"), we look to the main purpose 
of the action to define our scope of review.  Id. at 16, 690 S.E.2d at 773 
("Characterization of an action as equitable or legal depends on the . . .  main purpose 
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in bringing the action." (internal quotation and citations omitted)).  Here, the main 
purpose is to enforce an alleged unconditional duty to pay a beneficiary.  Actions 
involving trusts are almost always equitable, but there is an exception that applies 
here: an action against a trustee under an alleged immediate and unconditional 
obligation to pay money to a beneficiary is a legal action.  4 Scott & Ascher on Trusts 
§ 24.2.1 at 1660 (5th ed. 2007); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 198(1) (Am. Law 
Inst. 1959); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-1001 cmt. (Supp. 2018) (noting only 
traditional remedy at law for breach of trust was limited to suits to enforce 
obligations to pay money and deliver chattels, otherwise, remedies for breach of trust 
were "exclusively equitable").  We must affirm the verdict in a legal action tried by 
a judge alone if any evidence reasonably supports it.  See Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. 
City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1976), abrogated on other 
grounds by In re Estate of Kay, 423 S.C. 476, 816 S.E.2d 542 (2018).  
 
Although Verenes involved the right to a jury trial rather than standards of review, 
its holding rested on a conclusion that the main purpose of the damages action 
against the trustee there was equitable, as it sought the classic equitable remedies of 
restitution and disgorgement.  387 S.C. at 17, 690 S.E.2d at 773–74.  Based on the 
complaint here, and the historical classification of suits seeking enforcement of a 
trustee's obligation to pay money as legal actions—as recognized in the comment to 
section 62-7-1001 quoted above—we hold that this is an action at law rather than 
equity.  We acknowledge it is possible that after Verenes this action's main purpose 
could be classified as the equitable remedy of specific performance.  If so, our scope 
of review would expand to de novo, and we may find the facts based on our view of 
the evidence.  See S.C. Const. art. V, § 5; see also Doe v. Clark, 318 S.C. 274, 276, 
457 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1995).   
 
III.  
A. Breach of Trust/Fiduciary Duty 
The South Carolina Trust Code describes the duties of trustees and mandates that a 
trustee "shall administer the trust in good faith, in accordance with its terms and 
purposes and the interests of the beneficiaries . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-801 
(Supp. 2018).  The Code also imposes a duty of loyalty on the Trustee.  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-7-802(a) (Supp. 2018) ("A trustee shall administer the trust solely in the 
interests of the beneficiaries.").  Where, as here, a trust has two or more beneficiaries, 
the duty of loyalty includes a duty to "act impartially in investing, managing, and 
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distributing the trust property, giving due regard to the beneficiaries' respective 
interests."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-803 (Supp. 2018).  The Code also incorporates 
the common law of trusts and principles of equity to the extent they supplement its 
provisions.  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-106 (Supp. 2018).   
 
A breach of trust is simply a "violation by a trustee of a duty the trustee owes to a 
beneficiary . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-1001(a) (Supp. 2018); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 201 (Am. Law Inst. 1959); Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts § 93 (Am. Law Inst. 2012); 4 Scott & Ascher on Trusts, § 24.5.  
The trust instrument has been likened to a map on which the settlor has set the course 
the trustee must faithfully follow, and from which the trustee departs at his peril.  
Rodgers v. Herron, 226 S.C. 317, 330, 85 S.E.2d 104, 110 (1954); Womack v. Austin, 
1 S.C. 421, 438 (1870); see Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 73, cmt. (c) (Am. Law 
Inst. 2007) ("A fundamental duty of the trustee is to carry out the directions of the 
testator or settlor as expressed in the terms of the trust." (quoting Bogert, The Law 
of Trusts and Trustees § 541 (rev. 2d ed. 1993))).  
   
As the trial court noted, Karp's duty to execute Deborah's intent expressed in Article 
6, Section 4 in distributing the proceeds was absolute, not discretionary.  See Cartee 
v. Lesley, 290 S.C. 333, 336, 350 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1986) ("The powers of a trustee 
are either mandatory or discretionary.  A power is mandatory when it authorizes and 
commands the trustee to perform some positive act, and is discretionary when the 
trustee may refrain from exercising it.").   
 
We agree with the trial court that the trust's directive that Karp sell the house "as 
soon as practicable" and distribute the proceeds to Tyre and Hugh did not permit 
Karp to wait until she could ascertain the liquidity of the estate and the extent of any 
creditors' claims.  Such a delay is common and often required in the probate of a 
person's estate, but as Medlin testified, the unique trust provision here required 
expedited distribution to Tyre and Hugh.  Medlin acknowledged Karp's position was 
understandable and not one of bad faith, for § 62-3-505(a)(3) makes revocable trust 
assets subject to probate claims if the probate estate is insufficient to pay its creditors.  
But, as Medlin emphasized, Karp risked no personal liability by following Deborah's 
intent to expedite distribution of the house sale proceeds, as the Trust Code insulated 
her and allowed creditors to follow the money and recover against the distributee.  
See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-604(b) (Supp. 2018).  Medlin also noted in his affidavit 
that a personal representative or trustee is only liable to non-beneficiaries if they are 
personally at fault.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 62-3-808 (Supp. 2018); S.C. Code Ann. § 
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62-7-1010(b) (Supp. 2018); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-1002 (Supp. 2018) 
(stating trustee only liable to beneficiaries for breach of fiduciary duty).  He also 
testified the trust provision at issue was an expression of Deborah's intent that the 
distributions to Tyre and Hugh be given priority and expedited. 
 
We emphasize our holding is limited to the specific facts of this case and the 
specific language of this trust provision, which was part of an eighty page trust 
document that both Kennedy and Medlin deemed "a maze."  We acknowledge 
Karp was placed in a difficult spot, and the "soon as practicable" language 
limited her options.  Karp maintained she had not only the right but the duty to 
wait until the extent of the creditors' claims could be determined.  Kennedy 
agreed.  As we noted, that is the usual procedure for trustees and personal 
representatives.  However, there is nothing in the record that tells us what the 
assets and liabilities (including any potential estate tax liabilities) of either the 
Trust or Deborah's probate estate were.  Without this information, Karp's 
position falters.  Medlin testified it appeared the Trust had sufficient assets to 
safely distribute the house sale proceeds to Tyre and Hugh.  Without contrary 
evidence, we are constrained by the "any evidence" standard of review to 
affirm the trial court's ruling.  Our decision might be different were we viewing 
this issue through the de novo scope.   
 
Karp also attempted to justify her delay by pointing to the possibility that Deborah 
could have, without Karp's knowledge, changed the terms of the trust by exercising 
her testamentary power of appointment by will or codicil.  Even if we accept Karp's 
premise, the trust provides that if the trustee receives no notice of such a will or 
codicil within six months of Deborah's death, the trustee may distribute the trust "as 
though this power of appointment had not been exercised."  Because Karp's delay 
far exceeded this six month window, her continued withholding of trust distributions 
in reliance on a potential revision of the trust was untenable.   
 
There is no evidence Karp acted in bad faith.  While a Trustee is duty-bound to act 
in good faith, good faith alone will not excuse a breach of trust.  Once it is determined 
the trustee has failed to carry out the express terms of a trust, good faith "counts for 
nothing" in the breach of trust calculus.  Rollins v. May, 473 F. Supp. 358, 365 
(D.S.C. 1978); see 4 Scott & Ascher, § 24.5 ("A trustee who does the best it can, 




The trial court's factual findings concerning Karp's breach of trust are supported by 
evidence, and we must therefore affirm them.  See Townes Assocs., 266 S.C. at 86, 
221 S.E.2d at 775. 
B. The No-Contest Provision of the Trust 
We likewise affirm the trial court's finding that Hugh had probable cause to bring 
this action, rendering the no contest provision inoperable.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 
62-7-605 (Supp. 2018) ("A provision in a revocable trust purporting to penalize any 
interested person for contesting the validity of the trust or instituting other 
proceedings relating to the trust is unenforceable if probable cause exists for 
instituting proceedings."); see also Restatement (Third) of Property, Wills § 8.5 cmt. 
(c) (Am. Law Inst. 2003) ("Probable cause exists when, at the time of instituting the 
proceeding, there was evidence that would lead a reasonable person, properly 
informed and advised, to conclude that there was a substantial likelihood that the 
challenge would be successful.").  This again is a factual matter we are bound to 
uphold if supported by any evidence.  See Townes Assocs, 266 S.C. at 86, 221 S.E.2d 
at 775.  Professor Medlin's testimony, together with Deborah's intent as expressed 
in Article 6, Section 4 of the trust, supports the conclusion that Hugh acted 
reasonably in pursuing this action and it was likely he would prevail.  
C. Tyre's Status: Beneficiary or Creditor?  
Karp insists the trial court erred in treating Tyre as both a creditor and a beneficiary.  
She claims Tyre cannot be both (Medlin disagreed).  In Karp's view, Tyre was a 
creditor, and therefore, she could not be liable to Tyre for breach of trust, a cause of 
action only available to beneficiaries.  But this argument leads to a cul-de-sac, for 
even if Tyre was a creditor, it would not affect Karp's liability for breach of trust to 
Hugh due to her lack of timely distribution to him, nor would it affect our holding 
that probable cause existed for this lawsuit.  Assuming Tyre was a creditor, the no 
contest clause would not bind it.  If Tyre was a beneficiary, the no contest clause 
would not apply because Tyre had the same probable cause as Hugh to challenge 
Karp's actions.  A good argument could be made that Tyre was a beneficiary 
according to the Trust Code, which includes within the definition of beneficiary any 
person that "has a present or future beneficial interest in a trust . . . ."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-7-103(2)(A) (Supp. 2018).  We explain all of this to demonstrate that 
Karp's argument may be disposed of by one of the great appellate truths: "whatever 
doesn't make any difference, doesn't matter."  McCall v. Finley, 294 S.C. 1, 4, 362 
S.E.2d 26, 28 (Ct. App. 1987).   
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D. Karp's Personal Liability 
Karp contends the trial court erred by making her liable in both her capacity as 
trustee, and personally.  We conclude the trial court did not err.  
 
A trustee is liable to the beneficiaries for a breach of trust.  § 62-7-1002.  This 
liability is personal, and the trustee must pay any damages from his own funds.  See 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 100 cmt. a (Am. Law Inst. 2012) ("This Section 
addresses the measure of a trustee's personal liability for a breach of trust.").  
 
Karp argues section 62-7-1010 protects her from personal liability unless she was 
personally at fault.  This section, however, applies only to a trustee's liability to third 
parties and does not affect the trustee's personal liability to beneficiaries for breach 
of trust.  See South Carolina Trust Code Article 7, Part 10, General Comment 
("Sections 62-7-1010 through 62-7-1013 address trustee relations with persons other 
than beneficiaries.").  Section 1010 does, though, highlight that Karp had little risk 
of personal liability to third party creditors of Deborah's probate estate for promptly 
distributing the house sale proceeds as directed by the trust.   
 
Although Karp acted in good faith, a trustee is nevertheless personally liable for 
breach of trust.  See Crayton v. Fowler, 140 S.C. 517, 519, 139 S.E. 161, 161 (1927) 
("[I]t is clear under the law and the facts of the case that he must be held personally 
responsible for said loss.  It is a general rule of law that when a trustee departs from 
the directions contained in the trust instrument he is liable for any loss occasioned, 
irrespective of good faith or his best judgment."); see also Hogg v. Walker, 622 A.2d 
648, 653 (Del. 1993) ("A trustee's liability for a breach of trust is personal in 
character with all the consequences and incidents of personal liability."); In re Wills 
of Jacobs, 370 S.E.2d 860, 865 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) ("General common law 
principles hold that a trustee's breach of trust subjects him to personal liability."); 
90A C.J.S. Trusts § 343.  
E. Award of Attorney's Fees to Hugh 
Karp next claims error in the award of attorney's fees.  The Trust Code empowers 
trial courts to order attorney's fees in trust administration cases "as justice may 
require."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-1004 (Supp. 2018).  We must affirm a trial court's 
fee award if any evidence supports it.  Blumberg v. Nealco, Inc., 310 S.C. 492, 493, 
427 S.E.2d 659, 660 (1993).  The trial court's comprehensive written attorney's fee 
award tracked the criteria of Baron Data Systems v. Loter, 297 S.C. 382, 384–85, 
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377 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1989), and its factual conclusions are well anchored by the 
record.    
F. The Trust Protector and Subject Matter Jurisdiction  
Karp contends the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this action 
because the trust gives exclusive jurisdiction to the trust protector to resolve any 
disputes.   
 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general 
class to which the proceedings in question belong."  Dove v. Gold Kist, Inc., 314 
S.C. 235, 237–38, 442 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1994) (internal quotations omitted).  
Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law we review de 
novo.  See Capital City Ins. Co. v. BP Staff, Inc., 382 S.C. 92, 99, 674 S.E.2d 524, 
528 (Ct. App. 2009).    
 
A trust protector is defined as "a person, committee of persons or entity who is or 
who are designated as a trust protector whose appointment is provided for in the trust 
instrument."  S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-103(27) (Supp. 2018).  "The powers and 
discretions of a trust protector are as provided in the governing instrument and may 
be exercised or not exercised, in the best interests of the trust, in the sole and absolute 
discretion of the trust protector and are binding on all other persons."  S.C. Code 
Ann. § 62-7-818 (Supp. 2018).  There is no case law interpreting the role of trust 
protectors in South Carolina or their effect, if any, on subject matter jurisdiction.  
 
The parties designated Kennedy as Trust Protector.  Article 3, Section 8(h) of the 
Trust states, "The Trust Protector may unilaterally resolve any dispute, claim or 
conflict" between beneficiaries and the Trustee.  (emphasis added).  In the event the 
trust protector elects to resolve such disputes, the "resolution shall be binding on all 
parties to [the] Trust and shall not be subject to review."  Additionally, Section 8(h) 
declares: 
 
No one may file or instigate a claim in a court of law 
without first submitting the claim to the Trust Protector for 
resolution . . . .  The Trust Protector may submit the claim 
or dispute for mediation and/or binding arbitration.  
Subsequent to his or her review, the Trust Protector may 
give any claimant the authority to file and maintain an 
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action in a court of law. . . .  Whenever a dispute, conflict, 
or claim involves an interpretation or construction of [the] 
Trust Agreement, the Trust Protector may file an action in 
a court of competent jurisdiction for the interpretation and 
construction of such Trust Agreement, or may instruct 
[the] Trustee to do so. 
 
(emphasis added).   
 
The plain language of the trust shows Deborah intended a trust protector could, under 
certain circumstances, have binding authority to resolve disputes like the one that 
triggered this lawsuit.  It is not necessary for us to detail these circumstances, 
because none of them exist here.  By way of example, the trust protector provision 
arguably requires that any dispute be first presented to the trust protector before a 
lawsuit can be filed.  Yet here the trust protector was not appointed until months 
after filing.  Likewise, the trust protector provision states the trust protector may 
unilaterally resolve disputes, submit the dispute to mediation or arbitration, file a 
lawsuit to resolve the dispute, allow a claimant to file suit, or instruct the trustee to 
file suit.  Here, Kennedy in her report not only declined to resolve the dispute but 
encouraged Karp to seek judicial resolution. 
 
Whatever the contours of the trust protector's authority, we hold that under the 
circumstances here they do not extend to stripping the trial court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Probate Courts and Circuit Courts are specifically empowered to hear 




We therefore affirm the ruling of the trial court.  Finally, we dismiss Karp's appeal 
of the denial of her summary judgment motion.  See, e.g., Holloman v. McAllister, 
289 S.C. 183, 186, 345 S.E.2d 728, 729 (1986) ("[T]he denial of a motion for 
summary judgment before trial is not reviewable after a trial of a case on its merits."). 
 
Accordingly, the trial court's order is 
 
AFFIRMED IN PART AND DISMISSED IN PART. 
 
KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.  
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LOCKEMY, C.J.: Christy Byrd, as next friend of Julia B., a minor, appeals a 
trial court order denying her motion for a new trial and/or judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing the trial court erred in declining to 
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find the obstetric emergency statute inapplicable to this case as a matter of law.  
We affirm. 
FACTS 
Christy Byrd brought this medical malpractice action on behalf of Julia B., her 
minor daughter, alleging Dr. John B. Browning, her obstetrician, breached the 
standard of care in his October 8, 2009 delivery of Julia.  During the delivery, Julia 
presented with shoulder dystocia when her shoulder became stuck under her 
mother's pubic bone.  Byrd alleges Dr. Browning failed to properly manage and 
resolve Julia's shoulder dystocia during delivery, which resulted in a permanent 
brachial plexus nerve injury to Julia's right arm.   
On March 12, 2013, Byrd filed a summons and complaint on Julia's behalf against 
Dr. Browning and McLeod Physician Associates, Inc. (collectively Respondents). 1 
Respondents answered with general denials and asserted the affirmative defense of 
the emergency obstetrical care exception found in section 15-32-230 of the South 
Carolina Code (Supp. 2018).  Respondents later amended their answer to assert the 
solicitation of charitable funds act defense.  At the close of Respondents' case, 
Byrd moved for a directed verdict, arguing the obstetric emergency affirmative 
defense did not apply to the case as a matter of law because  
no witness has offered testimony as to the necessary 
elements, which include medical instability, immediate 
threat of death or harm.  Neither of these two of the three 
elements have been satisfied.  The only testimony that 
has come in on that has come in in direct contradiction of 
- - of witnesses' own sworn testimony. 
The trial court denied Byrd's motion.  The trial court charged the jury as follows 
concerning section 15-32-230: 
1 Byrd initially sued McLeod Physician Associates, Inc., but during the course of 
the trial, the trial court determined McLeod Physician Associates II was Dr. 
Browning's employer at the time of the delivery.  As such, McLeod Physician 
Associates, Inc. was replaced with McLeod Physician Associates II as the co-
defendant in this case. 
23 
In an action involving medical malpractice – in a medical 
malpractice claim arising out of care rendered in a 
genuine emergency situation in an obstetrician suite 
where the patient is not stable and there is an immediate 
threat of death or serious bodily harm to the patient, no 
physician may be held liable unless it is proven that the 
physician was grossly negligent.  In regards to this 
emergency exception, the defendants must prove this by 
the preponderance or greater weight of the evidence.  
In addition, the verdict form given to the jury, which neither party objected to, 
provided:  
1. Did the defendants prove by a greater weight or 
preponderance of the evidence that the facts of this 
case did arise out of a genuine emergency situation 
where the patient is not medically stable and there is 
an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury? 
The jury answered this question in the affirmative.  In addition, the jury determined 
Dr. Browning was not grossly negligent.  Byrd filed a motion for a new trial 
absolute and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court denied 
in an order dated July 11, 2016.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
"In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried by a jury, the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court extends merely to the correction of errors of law, and a factual 
finding by the jury will not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses 
there is no evidence which reasonably supports the jury's findings."  Wright v. 
Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 18, 640 S.E.2d 486, 495 (Ct. App. 2006). 
"When reviewing a motion for directed verdict or JNOV, an appellate court must 
employ the same standard as the trial court."  Id. "Motions for directed verdict or 
JNOV should be denied if the evidence yields more than one reasonable inference 
or its inference is in doubt." Allegro, Inc. v. Scully, 418 S.C. 24, 32, 791 S.E.2d 
140, 144 (2016) (citations omitted).  "An appellate court will reverse the trial 
court's ruling only if no evidence supports the ruling below." Id. 
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The denial of a motion for a new trial absolute or a new 
trial nisi for excessiveness of the verdict is a matter 
within the sound discretion of the trial judge.  The 
appellate court has no power to review his ruling unless it 
is wholly unsupported by the evidence or is controlled by 
an error of law. 
Soaper v. Hope Indus., Inc., 306 S.C. 531, 534, 413 S.E.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1992), 
aff'd as modified, 309 S.C. 438, 424 S.E.2d 493 (1992) (citations omitted).   
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Byrd argues the trial court erred in not finding the obstetric emergency exception is 
inapplicable to this case as a matter of law.  The obstetric emergency exception is 
contained in section 15-32-230 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018) and 
provides as follows: 
(A) In an action involving a medical malpractice claim 
arising out of care rendered in a genuine emergency 
situation involving an immediate threat of death or 
serious bodily injury to the patient receiving care in an 
emergency department or in an obstetrical or surgical 
suite, no physician may be held liable unless it is proven 
that the physician was grossly negligent. 
(B) In an action involving a medical malpractice claim 
arising out of obstetrical care rendered by a physician on 
an emergency basis when there is no previous 
doctor/patient relationship between the physician or a 
member of his practice with a patient or the patient has 
not received prenatal care, such physician is not liable 
unless it is proven such physician is grossly negligent. 
(C) The limitation on physician liability established by 
subsections (A) and (B) shall only apply if the patient is 
not medically stable and: 
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(1) in immediate threat of death; or 
(2) in immediate threat of serious bodily injury. 
Further, the limitation on physician liability established 
by subsections (A) and (B) shall only apply to care 
rendered prior to the patient's discharge from the 
emergency department or obstetrical or surgical suite. 
We agree with Byrd's assessment that section 15-32-230 is in derogation of the 
common law.  Therefore, we must adhere to the rule of strict construction of this 
statute. See Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular & Thoracic, PA, 422 S.C. 196, 201, 
810 S.E.2d 848, 850 (2018) ("Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
strictly construed.").  "Under this rule, a statute restricting the common law will not 
be extended beyond the clear intent of the legislature.  Statutes limiting a 
claimant's right to bring suit are subject to this rule."  Id. (citations omitted) 
(internal quotations omitted).  We also agree with Byrd's interpretation that under a 
strict construction of the statute, the physician must prove all of the three required 
elements: (1) the claim arises out of a genuine emergency situation, (2) the patient 
is not medically stable, and (3) the patient was under an immediate threat of death 
or serious bodily injury. 
Byrd concedes shoulder dystocia is a genuine emergency situation.  However, 
Byrd argues Respondents failed as a matter of law to satisfy the two remaining 
elements. Specifically, Byrd relies on data collected from the fetal heart 
monitoring strips, Apgar scores2, and cord blood gases to support a finding of 
medical stability and argues these test results did not indicate an immediate threat 
of death or serious bodily harm.  Byrd's experts, citing to this data, opined Julia 
was medically stable during the delivery. 
Many of Respondents' experts, however, opined that shoulder dystocia is by its 
nature a medically unstable condition.  Dr. Stacy Smithson testified the "most risky 
time during any birth is from the time the head is delivered until the time the 
2According to Byrd's obstetric and forensic medicine expert, Apgar scores are 
given to the baby after delivery based on the baby's color, breathing, tone, 
movement, respiratory rate, and heart rate.  
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remainder of the body is being delivered."  He acknowledged in his deposition 
testimony read into the record, "from the medical record . . . [t]he baby seemed 
fine." He noted the fetal monitoring strips did not suggest the baby was medically 
unstable. He also acknowledged the Apgar scores were fine.  However, he 
testified, "[t]he blood gases revealed some minor abnormalities, but in hindsight 
we can say that the baby was medically stable.  In the midst of a delivery, you 
cannot say that." In addition, he testified: "This baby was at a threat of immediate 
risk of brain damage and death the entire time the baby was stuck."   
Respondents' expert, Dr. Joseph Mack Ernest, testified as follows:  
Q: When you are delivering a baby and you encounter 
shoulder dystocia, is that a medically stable or an 
unstable situation? 
A: Well, it depends on how you define medically 
stable, and I was - - we discussed this in my 
deposition and I think it's important.  It's an 
important concept. 
If you talk about a particular part of the baby, is 
the heart rate stable? Well, the baby's heart rate 
was stable; so there was a medically stable heart 
rate. If you talk about the brain, during the 45 
seconds of this delivery, the baby's brain was 
medically stable, but if you look at the big picture, 
it was a medically unstable condition.  
Dr. Ernest then explained "medical stability" by describing a scenario in which he 
trips, cuts his forehead, and starts bleeding from an artery:  
I'm talking to you. I can walk.  I can breathe. My 
heart rate is okay, but I'm bleeding and it – and it's 
not stopping. At a point, I could die from that 
bleeding. 
. . . 
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Q: So do you have an opinion whether there is an 
immediate risk of harm when presented with the 
medical emergency of shoulder dystocia?  
A: Definitions are everything right?  And how do we 
define immediate? If immediate is if you don't fix 
it in a few minutes, there will be brain injury or 
death, then absolutely, and that's the situation.  So I 
think most people would consider if you are at risk 
of dying unless something is done in 4 to 5 
minutes that was immediate, yeah, I think it's an 
immediate risk.  
Dr. Ernest later stated, "If you talk about the global picture, there was a medical 
instability because the baby has a limited amount of oxygen, it was being used up, 
and the situation had to be fixed promptly."  
Respondents' pediatric neurology expert, Dr. Michael Duchowny, testified as to the 
risk to a baby from lack of oxygen during a shoulder dystocia. 
Q: It's your opinion obstetricians have over 5 to 6 
minutes of lack of oxygen until there's a risk to the 
baby true? 
A: In general, that's true, but there are two points to 
make here. One is that, firstly, it's different for 
every baby and, secondly, it's a continuum.  It's not 
like suddenly a switch gets thrown at six minutes 
to say that you're in the danger zone.  The longer 
the period of time that any of us are without 
oxygen, the higher the likelihood of some type of 
brain injury. 
. . . 
Q: And there was no indication in this case that either 
mother or baby were not medically stable; true? 
A: They were unstable.  Any situation where a baby is 
hung up in the birth canal is potentially a very 
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dangerous situation and it is one that presents an 
immediate danger of bodily harm of either - - 
either morbidity, brain injury or death. 
We must uphold the trial court's denial of Byrd's motion for a new trial absolute 
and or judgment notwithstanding the verdict if we find any evidence in the record 
purporting to satisfy these two remaining elements.  Here, the experts seem to 
agree the data from the fetal heart monitoring strips, Apgar scores, and cord blood 
gases indicated stability. However, Respondents' experts testified medical stability 
is not based on this information alone.  Respondents' experts view shoulder 
dystocia as a medically unstable situation because if the baby is not delivered, lack 
of oxygen to can lead to a brain injury or death.   
As we explained in Small v. Pioneer Machinery, Inc., 329 S.C. 448, 465, 494 
S.E.2d 835, 843-44 (Ct. App. 1997), 
[i]n a law case tried before a jury, it is the jury that must 
decide what part of the witness's testimony it wants to 
believe and what part it wants to disbelieve.  Under such 
circumstances, it is not the function of this [c]ourt to 
weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
While Byrd does not agree with Respondents' view of what constitutes medical 
stability, this view is contained in the record and provides a basis from which a 
jury could determine the requirements of section 15-32-230 were met.  
Byrd asserts Dr. Browning admitted he did not believe Byrd or Julia were under an 
immediate threat of serious injury or death and he thought they were medically 
stable during the delivery. Byrd cites to Dr. Browning's testimony during cross-
examination. 
Q: This child was never at immediate threat of brain 
damage in those 45 seconds, was she? 
A: No, but you're not - - what you're thinking is to 
resolve this right away in a correct fashion. 
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Q: No patient was at risk or at immediate threat of 
death or serious permanent - - or serious bodily 
injury during those 45 seconds; true? 
A: Well, at the very start of recognizing the shoulder 
dystocia, that threat of brain injury, that threat of 
death is there. You go through your motions.  
You're not looking at the clock to resolve that 
problem.  
Q: But there's no immediate threat for at least five to 
seven minutes; true? 
A: Well, I would say that when you start getting over 
two or three minutes, there's an increasing risk of 
problems. 
Q: But in the first 45 seconds, there's no immediate 
threat of any serious harm; true? 
A:  True. 
However, on direct examination by Respondents' counsel, Dr. Browning testified 
he did not believe the patient was medically stable.  Dr. Browning also testified, 
"[T]he more time it takes to resolve the shoulder dystocia, the more risk of having 
gradual incremental brain injury and then death."  
"[N]either an appellate court nor the trial court has authority to decide credibility 
issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence."  Bass v. S.C. Dep't 
of Soc. Servs., 414 S.C. 558, 570, 780 S.E.2d 252, 258 (2015).  While Byrd argues 
Dr. Browning's testimony was inconsistent, these inconsistences were for the jury, 
not the court, to resolve. 
Byrd also asserts Respondents' expert misinterpreted the meaning of the term 
"medically stable" as used in section 15-32-230.  Byrd refers to Dr. Ernest's 
testimony previously cited.  Byrd argues that particular definition is too broad.  We 
agree, under Dr. Ernest's definition of medical stability, a patient would never be 
medically stable in any "emergency situation."  A medical emergency by its nature 
would not be an emergency if it did not have the potential for the patient to become 
medically unstable and pose a risk of serious bodily injury or death.  Nevertheless, 
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Byrd failed to present this argument to the trial court and presents it for the first 
time on appeal.   
"[A]n issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been raised 
to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review."  Wilder 
Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1998).  Furthermore, "a 
party cannot argue one ground at trial then another ground on appeal" State v. 
McCray, 332 S.C. 536, 542, 506 S.E.2d 301, 303 (1998) (citing State v. Byram, 
326 S.C. 107, 113, 485 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1997)).  
Byrd voiced agreement with the jury charge on the emergency medical and 
obstetrical care statute.  Byrd insisted the charge make clear this provision is an 
affirmative defense and the charge include the definition of gross negligence.  Byrd 
pressed the trial court to include the "not medically stable" requirement in the 
charge and the verdict form.  Byrd, however, did not request the charge provide a 
definition of "medical stability" or otherwise object to the charge.  Moreover, in 
her motion for a new trial or JNOV, Byrd argued the record lacked competent 
testimony to establish the elements of the defense.  Byrd's motion did not make any 
arguments relating to the definition of "medical stability."  Because Byrd did not 
object to the jury charges or the verdict form and argued a different ground on 
appeal than at trial, we agree with Respondents that this argument is not preserved 
for our review. 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Byrd's 
motion for a new trial absolute and or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  
Therefore, the trial court's order is   
AFFIRMED. 
SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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